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A RISK BASED APPROACH FOR SELECTING SERVICES 
IN BUSINESS PROCESS EXECUTION 
 
Stefan Sackmann, Lutz Lowis, Kai Kittel1 
 
 
Abstract 
The vision of automated business processes within a service-oriented paradigm includes the flexible 
orchestration of IT services. Whenever alternative services are available for activities in an IT-
supported business process, an automated decision is worth aspiring to. According to value-
oriented management, this decision should be motivated economically and also requires taking 
account of risk. This paper presents a novel approach for assessing the risk of IT services, based on 
vulnerability information as can be obtained in the form of publicly available Common Vulnera-
bility Scoring System (CVSS) data.  
 
1. Automating IT service selection  
 
Market forces are raising companies’ ability to respond quickly and flexibly to changing demands, 
which is seen as one of the main competitive advantages of the future [1, 23]. To keep pace, direct-
ing business models towards automation is still regarded as an important strategic topic [25] and 
aligning the technological infrastructure to service oriented architecture (SOA) seems a feasible and 
promising way [10, 16]. Apparently, present SOA and standards such as BPEL or BPMN are still in 
need of improvement to satisfy business demands [29] and the present hype around service 
orientation is endangered by setbacks [13]. Nevertheless, prominent suppliers of hard- and software 
are already embodying service orientation into their products: IBM offers Websphere [19], SAP 
integrates Netweaver [6], and Microsoft uses services in Windows Vista [4].  
 
Besides the technical feasibility of SOA, exploiting the full potential of services requires solutions 
to several business demands. In this contribution, the focus is laid on one of these issues: the 
automated selection between alternative IT services available for supporting the execution of 
business process activities. Since the ability of an IT service to meet business process-specific 
protection goals is crucial, a method for assessing the risk of an IT service within the context of the 
supported business process is developed. The method consists of two major parts: The first part 
proposes a new way to measure the probability of achieving protection goals within an IT service 
by assessing vulnerabilities. The second part extends business process models by an economic de-
cision algorithm that also takes risk into consideration and enables an automated decision between 
alternative IT services in the concrete execution context. Addressing these two parts, the remainder 
of this contribution is structured as follows: in section 2, a layer-based model is introduced bringing 
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the economic and technical view of IT risk together and serving as starting point for structuring IT 
services. Based upon this model, in section 3, a measure for the ability of an IT service to achieve 
protection goals from IT security research is presented and discussed. In section 4, this measure is 
integrated into an economic decision algorithm for business process activities taking the riskiness 
of alternative IT services into consideration. Subsequently, it is demonstrated how the algorithm 
works by means of an exemplified purchase process. The contribution concludes by discussing 
limitations of the method and by proposing possible solutions. 
 
2. IT Risk Reference Model - Bridging the technical and economic view 
 
The challenges to a value-oriented risk management process and continuous risk assessment, result-
ing from a constantly changing IT support of business processes as in SOA, have been discussed in 
[20, 21]. Following the notion of service orientation, automating business processes means that 
services are not exclusively used for one specific business process but manifold. Furthermore, the 
orchestration of the IT services changes dynamically according to the business context and is not 
statically wired in advance at the time when the business process is designed. Since the economic 
risk depends on the business process supported, the riskiness of an IT service should be specified 
independently of its actual integration. Therefore, typical measures for assessing IT security that 
already include economic exposure, e.g. an annual loss expectancy (ALE) [3] or business adjusted 
risk (BAR) [12], are unsuitable. It seems more advisable to look for measures that characterize the 
riskiness of IT services in a form that can be integrated into the service description and thus, e.g., 
become part of a service or protection level agreement (SLA/PLA) [14]. The approach in hand has 
been developed with a focus on services provided within a trusted domain, i.e. a company’s internal 
services or external services of business partners under contractual relationship.  
Business Process
IT Services / IT Infrastructure
Economic
handling of
IT risks
Threats
Technological
handling of
IT risks
Attacks exploit
vulnerabilities and 
violate protection goals
Violations of protection goals
disturb the business process
and have (usually negative) 
effects on company results
Vulnerabilities
 
Figure 1: IT Risk Reference Model [20] 
 
For measuring the riskiness of IT services, the measures used should rely on a systematic modeling 
of relations between causes and effects of IT risks. For this purpose, the IT Risk Reference Model 
has been developed [20] that is structured following a hierarchical abstraction layer model as used 
in computer science for reducing complexity, e.g. in network communication [28]. On the basis of 
four different layers (Figure 1), the economic, process-oriented view is brought together with the 
technical, threat-oriented view of IT risk. Beginning with the economic view, the top layer repre-
sents the “effects” and contains all activities of the business process that are regarded as assets from 
a risk perspective. The next layer contains all IT services and their underlying IT infrastructure 
representing IT resources for the superordinated process activities. Vulnerabilities constitute the 
“bridge” between the economic and the technical layers since they are possible points of attack for 
threats violating protection goals of the IT applications [24]. Thus, since a large part of attacks re-
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sult from exploitation of known vulnerabilities (see e.g. [22]), the following layer represents the 
vulnerabilities of these applications, while the set of all known threats is part of the bottom layer 
representing the causes. 
Although the IT Risk Reference Model has been developed with a different focus on measuring 
changes between causes and effects of IT risk, the achievable link provides a suitable starting point 
for the aspired measure. Since vulnerabilities can only be identified in relation to protection goals 
[17], measuring the probabilities of an IT service to achieve protection goals that are relevant to 
superordinated business processes is seen as a promising approach. In IT security research, there 
are several protection goals discussed [5, 17, 30]. For the beginning, focusing on the three main 
protection goals, confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA), is proposed for mainly three 
reasons: firstly, since the riskiness of an IT service is highly dependent on the IT security achieved, 
these protection goals are relevant for business processes [18]. Secondly, there is a well established 
methodical understanding of these protection goals in IT security research [2]. Thirdly, focusing on 
high-level protection goals does not limit the applicability of the method: more context-specific 
protection goals can be considered. According to this view, an IT service is considered to be secure 
(no risk) if it has no known vulnerabilities affecting the IT service’s confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of data or processes. 
 
Cn , In , AnC2 , I2 , A2
Business Process
IT Service1 IT Service2 IT Servicen…
C1 , I1 , A1
C*,  I*,  A* 
C* = expected loss in case of violation of confidentiality
I* = expected loss in case of violation of integrity
A* = expected loss in case of violation of availability
Ck = probability of service k‘s confidentiality
Ik = probability of service k‘s integrity
Ak = probability of service k‘s availability
Decision: 
IT Service with minimal expected loss
 
Figure 2: Protection goals – Linking business processes and IT service 
 
A decision-theory based selection requires two measures (Figure 2). Firstly, the damage resulting 
from non-achievement different protection goals has to be quantified according to the context of the 
business process. This could be realized either by relative evaluation (see, e.g., the POSeM model 
of [18]) or monetary assessment, e.g. in the form of expected loss and will be discussed in more 
detail in section 4. Secondly, it is necessary to determine the probability of an IT service violating 
the protection goals. For assessing these probabilities automatically, a new method is proposed in 
the following section. 
 
3. Measuring IT Service Riskiness 
 
Following the IT Risk Reference Model, vulnerabilities are the key factor since they allow attackers 
to harm protection goals. It is assumed that not all known vulnerabilities can instantly be closed for 
economical and technical reasons (e.g., limited time and money, patches not available). Otherwise, 
a risk-based approach would be pointless. Prominent methods for identifying vulnerabilities are 
penetration tests [2] or source code analysis [7]. Furthermore, for the technical infrastructure on 
which the IT services run, vulnerabilities can be queried from publicly accessible vulnerability 
databases. This allows an initial estimation of a company’s security level by looking at the sheer 
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number of known vulnerabilities, as well as gauging the effects a given vulnerability’s exploitation 
would have on the individual IT security protection goals.  
 
3.1. Vulnerability Information Sources 
 
The approach presented works with any vulnerability database that offers information on the CIA 
impact caused through exploiting a given vulnerability. In this contribution, the well known 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [8] database is used offering data according to the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) as shown in Table 1. The Base Score Metrics not 
only indicate the impact of exploiting a vulnerability, but also where it can be exploited from, how 
complex the exploit is, and how often the attacker must authenticate to the target. The Temporal 
Score Metrics offer detailed information on the availability of an exploit, existing countermeasures, 
and the credibility of the vulnerability details.  
 
Table 1: CVE scheme and CVSS values [9] 
 
Unique CVE name: CVE-abcd-wxyz 
Affected Product/Service: [name and version] 
Original release date: mm/dd/yyyy; Last revised: mm/dd/yyyy;  Source: [e.g.] US-CERT/NIST  
Overview [textual description] 
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools. [list of links to other  databases, e.g., SecurityFocus] 
Vulnerable software and versions: Configuration [list of operating systems and patch levels] 
Technical Details 
Vulnerability Type: [e.g.] Input Validation  (CWE-20); [links to CVE Standard Vulnerability Entries and 
Common Platform Enumeration] 
CVSS Base Score: 0 (Low) to 10 (High) (Impact Subscore 0 to 10, Exploitability Subscore 0 to 10) 
CVSS Temporal Score: 0 (Low) to 10 (High) 
CVSS v2 Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C) 
Published: mm/dd/yyyy 
CVSS metric group CVSS metric CVSS values 
Base Score Metrics   
     Exploitability Metrics Access Vector local (0.395), adjacent network (0.646), network (1) 
Access Complexity low (0.71), medium (0.61), high (0.35) 
Authentication none (0.704), single (0.56), multiple (0.45) 
     Impact Metrics Confidentiality Impact none (0), partial (0.275), complete (0.66) 
Integrity Impact none (0), partial (0.275), complete (0.66) 
Availability Impact none (0), partial (0.275), complete (0.66) 
Temporal Score Metrics Exploitability unproven (0.85), proof-of-concept (0.9), 
functional (0.95), high (1), not defined (1) 
Remediation Level official fix (0.87), temporary fix (0.9), workaround 
(0.95), unavailable (1), not defined (1) 
Report Confidence unconfirmed (0.9), uncorroborated (0.95),  
confirmed (1), not defined (1) 
 
At present, the vast majority of CVE entries relates to software applications other than web ser-
vices. In future, once a critical amount of web services is in operational use, web service vulnerabi-
lities can be expected to be listed in CVE or a similar database. Therefore, for assessing IT services, 
exemplary values of actual CVE entries for software applications are used in this contribution. 
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3.2. CVSS and Attack Probabilities  
 
In practice, attack probabilities often rely on subjective expert estimates given by, e.g., system 
administrators with a varying degree of experience, which is seen as a major drawback in the IT 
security field [27]. Since web services might come and go too quickly to allow expert estimates or 
even collecting historical data on the attack probabilities, assessing vulnerabilities might provide 
valuable information and extracting probabilities from CVSS data is seen as promising method: 
CVSS metrics reflect a strong link between threats, vulnerabilities, and the violation of protection 
goals. Also, a correlation between the effort in exploiting vulnerabilities and the probability of suc-
cessful attacks can be assumed. Although CVSS metrics give, strictly spoken, no information about 
the actual probability of an attack, taking this link into consideration for a risk assessment can be 
expected to lead to more accurate results than existing methods for estimating attack probabilities. 
This issue is not yet fully analyzed and subject to further evaluation and research. However, once a 
suitable method for measuring attack probabilities for IT services should become evident, this could 
be incorporated into the proposed approach without any methodical change. 
 
3.3. Measures for Protection Goals 
 
In its simplest form, CVSS calculates a score between 0 and 10 for any vulnerability in the data-
base, representing the lowest threat level, 10 the highest. Following the CVSS calculation, the base 
score is calculated according to the following equation [9]: 
( ) ( )( )ImpactflityExploitabiImpactdecimaltoroundBaseScore ⋅−⋅+⋅= 5.14.06.0_1__  (1)
The components Impact, Exploitability, and f (Impact) are calculated according to the following 
equations, whereby the absolute numbers are given by the CVSS method: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )tyImpactAvailabilimpactIntegrityItalityImpacConfidentiImpact −⋅−⋅−−⋅= 111141.10 (2)
tionAuthenticalexityAccessComporAccessVectlityExploitabi ⋅⋅⋅= 20  (3)
( )
⎩⎨
⎧ =
=
otherwise   
 if        
176.1
00 Impact
Impactf  (4)
According to the temporal situation, the BaseScore can be combined with the temporal exploitabi-
lity values to include information on automated exploits and fixes according to equation (5) and (6): 
idenceReportConfnLevelRemediatiolityExploitabiTempBase ⋅⋅=  (5)
( )TempBaseBaseScoredecimaltoroundoreTemporalSc ⋅= _1__  (6)
However, neither the BaseScore nor the TemporalScore show which protection goal(s) the vulnera-
bility under consideration puts at risk. Therefore, an adaptation of the calculation is proposed here 
for calculating the scores for each protection goal separately. This requires an adaptation of the 
CVSS values of the impact metrics by replacing equation (2). In order to keep the range of values 
between 0 and 10, the weights are adapted as follows without changing the basic method of CVSS: 
 
Table 2: Adjusted CIA impact values 
 
Metric Values 
Confidentiality Impact none (0), partial (1.7), complete (10) 
Integrity Impact none (0), partial (1.7), complete (10) 
Availability Impact none (0), partial (1.7), complete (10) 
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Accordingly, equation (4) is split up and adapted for each of the three protection goals: 
( )
⎩⎨
⎧ =
=
otherwise   
 if         
176.1
00 talityImpacConfidenti
CImpactf  (4a)
( )
⎩⎨
⎧ =
=
otherwise   
 if        
176.1
00 mpactIntegrityI
IImpactf           (4b)
( )
⎩⎨
⎧ =
=
otherwise   
 if        
176.1
00 tyImpactAvailabili
AImpactf       (4c)
Based on these adjustments, the probability that an exploit of the vulnerability under consideration 
will harm one of the protection goals can be calculated as follows:  
( ) ( ) 101.05.14.06.0 ≤≤⋅⋅⋅−⋅+⋅= CwithTempCImpactflityExploitabiCImpactC  (6a)
( ) ( ) 101.05.14.06.0 ≤≤⋅⋅⋅−⋅+⋅= IwithTempIImpactflityExploitabiIImpactI  (6b)
( ) ( ) 101.05.14.06.0 ≤≤⋅⋅⋅−⋅+⋅= AwithTempAImpactflityExploitabiAImpactA  (6c)
As single services can have several vulnerabilities, multiple CVSS scores must sometimes be com-
bined. Following the approach of [24], the arithmetic average is used as total score. In the case 
where further information on dependencies between several vulnerabilities is available, e.g. that 
they can only be exploited in a specific order, this calculation of course can be replaced by more 
detailed approaches as, e.g., discussed in [26]. 
 
3.4. Calculation Example 
 
With the adapted CVSS score at hand, every IT service can be assessed regarding its probability of 
achieving each of the protection goals. This is demonstrated for an exemplary service with three 
vulnerabilities (see Table 3) which will later be referred to when demonstrating the outstanding 
economic decision.  
 
Table 3: Sample vulnerability details 
 
IT Service1 
CVSS metrics Values 
 Vulnerability 1.1 Vulnerability 1.2 Vulnerability 1.3 
Access Vector local (0.395) local (0.395) local (0.395) 
Access Complexity high (0.35) high (0.35) high (0.35) 
Authentication none (0.704) single (0.56) multiple (0.45) 
Confidentiality Impact partial (1.7),  none (0) none (0) 
Integrity Impact none (0) partial (1.7) none (0) 
Availability Impact none (0) none (0) partial (1.7) 
Exploitability unproven (0.85) unproven (0.85) high (1) 
Remediation Level official fix (0.87) unavailable (1) unavailable (1) 
Report Confidence unconfirmed (0.9) uncorroborated (0.95) uncorroborated (0.95) 
 
The CIA-probabilities of exploitability for IT Service1 as well as the temporal scores can then be 
calculated according to equations (3) and (5). Inserting the results into equation (6a), (6b), or (6c), 
and calculating the corresponding impact with equation (4a), (4b), or (4c), the complete equation 
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for the three protection goals can be resolved. Using the exemplary values from vulnerabilities 1.1, 
1.2, and 1.3 (see Table 3) leads to the following results. 
( ) 023.01.0)9.087.085.0(176.15.1)704.035.0395.020(4.07.16.0 =⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅+⋅=C  
( ) 013.01.0)95.0185.0(176.15.1)56.035.0395.020(4.07.16.0 =⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅+⋅=I  
( ) 002.01.0)95.011(176.15.1)45.035.0395.020(4.07.16.0 =⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅+⋅=A  
In the same way, the CIA-probabilities for the other IT services can be calculated according to their 
vulnerabilities. Omitting the detailed values for brevity, the following vulnerabilities and probabili-
ties are assumed. 
 
Table 4: Exemplary services and their vulnerabilities 
 
 IT Service1 IT Service2 IT Service3 
Vuln. # 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
C 0.023   0.029   0.002   0.011   
I  0.013   0.011   0.001   0.015  
A   0.002   0.014   0.035   0.012 
 
Given that vulnerabilities 1.1 to 1.3 can be found in IT Service1, IT Service2 has vulnerabilities 2.1 
to 2.3, and vulnerabilities 3.1 to 3.6 are related to IT Service3, the resulting probabilities are shown 
in Figure 3. To combine the values of several vulnerabilities within one service, the arithmetic aver-
age is used as mentioned above. In addition, since low CVSS values stand for a low threat level, the 
values have to be inverted for getting the aspired probabilities: for example, vulnerability 2.1 in 
service 2 has a low threat level of 0.029 with regard to confidentiality, i.e. a high probability of 
0.971 of achieving that protection goal. 
 
IT Service1 IT Service2 IT Service3
C1 = 0.977
I1 = 0.987
A1 = 0.998
C2 = 0.971
I2 = 0.989
A2 = 0.986
C3 = 0.9935
I3 = 0.992
A3 = 0.9765
 
Figure 3: Exemplary services with CIA probabilities 
 
4. Automated Selection of IT Services  
 
The characterization of the IT services according to their capability to achieve the protection goals 
is only part of the information that is needed for an automated selection between alternative IT 
services at runtime. The missing part for an economic and value-oriented selection is an assessment 
of the expected loss for each protection goal in the case of its violation. These values mainly de-
pend on the actual business process that is executed and typically varies from instance to instance. 
Therefore, the expected losses have to be determined context-specific for each instance. For 
example, one activity of a purchasing process might require sending a document to the supplier. A 
box of screws could be ordered with lower confidentiality than a special component that might 
inform competitors about a new product and thus imply a competitive disadvantage. Bringing 
together the CIA measures of the IT service with the CIA requirements of the business process 
facilitates a risk-based selection of the most suitable IT service at runtime. Thus, an orchestration of 
the IT services ex ante, i.e., when designing the business process, becomes obsolete and, assuming 
an appropriate extension of the business process model, can be delegated to the business process 
execution engine.  
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However, the required assessment of the expected loss in the case of a protection goal violation is a 
complex task and can hardly be realized by assessing each single activity of a business process that 
is supported by an IT service. Therefore, a hierarchical model is proposed where elements inherit 
their values from superordinated elements, e.g. a core processes from its superordinated business 
process. Such hierarchical models are very well known in business process management, e.g. with-
in the framework of British Telecom [11] or the breakdown of business processes through to core 
processes and detailed processes [15]. If such a uniform “inheritance” is too broad, the values can 
be adapted on every level and for every instance of the modeled business process as needed.  
 
Equipping each IT service with CIA measures as described in section 3 and each IT supported 
activity of a business process with corresponding monetary values allows an automated decision 
between alternative IT services, taking not only costs but also risk into consideration. Then, the 
expected costs E of an IT service k can be calculated as sum of the direct costs (e.g. for using the 
service) and indirect costs (e.g. cost of changing between services) Costk and the expected loss in 
the event of a confidentiality breach LoC, loss of integrity LoI, and non-availability LoA: 
LoAALoIILoCCCostE kkkkk ⋅−+⋅−+⋅−+= )1()1()1( (7)
The expected costs have to be calculated for every IT service that comes into question to support 
the considered activity of the business process. According to a value-oriented and a risk-neutral 
decision strategy, the service which results in the lowest expected costs is to be chosen. For demon-
stration purposes, the example above is revived: a business process activity requires sending a 
document and there are three functionally identical IT services (e.g. e-mail, Internet form via https, 
and EDI) available with their CIA measures as described in section 3.4. The direct costs for sending 
the document amount to 0.01 € for IT Service1, 0.02 € for IT Service2, and 1.10 € for IT Service3. 
Indirect costs are ignored for keeping the example simple. In the first scenario, when ordering a box 
of screws, a violation of confidentiality would result in no loss, a violation of integrity would cost 
25.00 € due to sending back the wrong box, and non-availability of the service would cost 1.70 €. 
Calculating the expected costs for each service shows that IT Service2 is the one to be chosen: 
€34.1€70.1)9765.01(€00.25)992.01(€00.0)9935.01(€10.1
€32.0€70.1)986.01(€00.25)989.01(€00.0)971.01(€02.0
€34.0€70.1)998.01(€00.25)987.01(€00.0)977.01(€01.0
3
2
1
=⋅−+⋅−+⋅−+=
=⋅−+⋅−+⋅−+=
=⋅−+⋅−+⋅−+=
E
E
E
 (8)
In the second scenario, when ordering a special component, where the pure fact of ordering could 
inform competitors about a new product, a violation of confidentiality would result in a high loss 
and cost 30,000.00 €, a violation of integrity would also cost 25.00 €, and again, non-availability 
1.70 €. In this scenario, the calculation of the expected costs for each service would change to: 
€34.196€70.1)9765.01(€00.25)992.01(€00.000,30)9935.01(€10.1
€32.870€70.1)986.01(€00.25)989.01(€00.000,30)971.01(€02.0
€34.690€70.1)998.01(€00.25)987.01(€00.000,30)977.01(€01.0
3
2
1
=⋅−+⋅−+⋅−+=
=⋅−+⋅−+⋅−+=
=⋅−+⋅−+⋅−+=
E
E
E
 (9)
Thus, it would be advisable to send the order via IT Service3. Taking only the costs into conside-
ration or fixing an IT service statically to an activity at the moment of business process design 
would inherently result in a non-optimal selection. 
 
5. Discussion and Outlook 
 
In future SOA, where several alternative IT services are available for realizing activities of business 
processes, a method is required to select the most suitable one. Statically fixing a specific service to 
a specific business process activity at design time, or even selecting the IT service dynamically by 
364
only taking costs into consideration, results in a non-optimal selection from a value-oriented view. 
Therefore, in this contribution, a method for taking riskiness of IT services into consideration has 
been developed and presented. Protection goals from IT security research, namely confidentiality, 
integrity and availability are proposed as “risk interface” between the IT service and the business 
process. A value-oriented selection of IT services requires two extensions: business process models 
have to be extended with economic values for not achieving protection goals and IT service 
descriptions have to be extended with measures for achieving these protection goals.  
 
For extending IT service descriptions, CIA measures have been introduced relying on CVSS data. 
One significant advantage of this approach is that the determination of CIA measures follows a 
methodic approach and can be automated. It allows the actual relevance of known vulnerabilities to 
be considered, e.g. if there is a known automated exploit of a vulnerability, this will be reflected in 
the respective CVSS values and, thus, immediately change the CIA measures of every correspond-
ing IT service. However, there are also several limitations in our approach. One clear subject of 
further discussion is our interpretation of the CIA measures as probabilities. While a connection 
between CIA measures and probabilities of violations seem plausible, it remains subject to further 
research whether this assumption holds or not and how a company’s specific situation can be taken 
into consideration, e.g., through adjusted CVSS data. However, should a more precise method for 
calculating actual probabilities of meeting protection goals become available, it would be easy to 
extend our approach without having to change the whole risk-based selection of IT services. As 
mentioned above, additional protection goals such as authentication or accountability can easily be 
included whenever the required information about corresponding vulnerabilities is available. 
 
A further point of discussion is the application of the CIA measures for IT services provided by 
external suppliers. For IT services integrated from outside the company’s domain, it usually will 
not be possible to analyze vulnerabilities according to the service and the underlying IT infra-
structure. However, the proposed CIA measures can also serve as external metrics that can be 
monitored without knowing internal metrics of the service itself and thus be integrated into SLA. 
For calculating the measures, the external service provider has to transform them into internal 
metrics and this can be achieved by applying the proposed method. In this case, the approach 
presented has to be extended to cope with the additional trust issues, e.g., by integrating control 
goals of compliance management – a challenging topic of further research. 
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